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Abstract
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individ-
uals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular,
they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to het-
erogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences, fighting abilities, and positions in a
social network. In such a population, an individual may imitate successful
and similar others, where similarity refers to that in the idiosyncratic fitness
function. I propose an evolutionary game model with two subpopulations on
the basis of multipopulation replicator dynamics to describe such a situation.
In the proposed model, pairs of players are involved in a two-person game as
a well-mixed population, and imitation occurs within subpopulations in each
of which players have the same payoff matrix. It is shown that the model
does not allow any internal equilibrium such that the dynamics differs from
that of other related models such as the bimatrix game. In particular, even
a slight difference in the payoff matrix in the two subpopulations can make
the opposite strategies to be stably selected in the two subpopulations in the
snowdrift and coordination games.
Keywords: evolutionary game; replicator dynamics; homophily; coopera-
tion
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1. Introduction
A basic assumption underlying many evolutionary and economic game
theoretical models is that individuals are the same except for possible dif-
ferences in the strategy that they select. In fact, a population of individu-
als involved in ecological or social interaction is considered to be heteroge-
neous. For example, different individuals may have different fighting abil-
ities or endowments (Landau, 1951; Hammerstein, 1981; Maynard Smith,
1982; McNamara et al., 1999), occupy different positions in contact networks
specifying the peers with whom the game is played (Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007;
Jackson, 2008), or have different preferences over the objective outcome of
the game. The last situation is succinctly represented by the Battle of the
Sexes game in which a wife and husband prefer to go to watch opera and
football, respectively, whereas their stronger priority is on going out together
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957) (the Battle of the Sexes game here is different from
the one that models conflicts between males and females concerning parental
investment as described in Dawkins (1976); Schuster and Sigmund (1981);
Maynard Smith (1982); Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, 1998)). In behavioral
game experiments, the heterogeneity of subjects is rather a norm than ex-
ceptions (e.g., Camerer (2003)). For example, some humans are cooperative
in the public goods game and others are not (e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001);
Jacquet et al. (2012)), and some punish non-cooperators more than others
do (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Dreber et al., 2008).
Evolution of strategies in such a heterogeneous population is the focus of
the present paper. This question has been examined along several lines.
First, in theory of preference, it is assumed that individuals maximize
their own idiosyncratic utilities that vary between individuals. The util-
ity generally deviates from the fitness on which evolutionary pressure oper-
ates (e.g., Sandholm (2001); Dekel et al. (2007); Alger and Weibull (2012);
Grund et al. (2013)).
In fact, experimental evidence shows that individuals tend to imitate be-
havior of similar others in the context of diffusion of innovations (Rodgers,
2003) and health behavior (Centola, 2011). Also in the context of economic
behavior described as games, individuals may preferentially imitate similar
others because similar individuals are expected to be interested in maximizing
similar objective functions. This type of behavior is not considered in pre-
vious preference models in which individuals can instantaneously maximize
their own payoffs, and selection occurs on the basis of the fitness function
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common to the entire population. The model proposed in this study deals
with evolutionary dynamics in which individuals in a heterogeneous popula-
tion mimic successful and similar others. The similarity here refers to that
in the idiosyncratic preference.
Second, evolution in heterogeneous populations has been investigated
with the use of the evolutionary bimatrix game (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1988, 1998; Weibull, 1995). A payoff bimatrix describes the payoff imparted
to the two players in generally asymmetric roles. In its evolutionary dy-
namics, a population is divided into two subpopulations, pairs of individuals
selected from the different subpopulations play the game, and selection oc-
curs within each subpopulation. The population then has bipartite structure
induced by the fixed role of individuals. However, the most generic pop-
ulation structure for investigating interplay of evolution via social learning
and idiosyncratic preferences would be a well-mixed population without fixed
roles of individuals.
Third, evolutionary game dynamics on heterogeneous social networks
(Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007) is related to evolution in heterogeneous populations.
In most of the studies on this topic, the payoff to an individual per generation
is defined as the obtained payoff summed over all the neighboring individu-
als. Then, cooperation in social dilemma games is enhanced on heterogeneous
networks (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Dura´n and Mulet, 2005; Santos et al.,
2006). In this framework, hubs (i.e., those with many neighbors) and non-
hubs are likely to gain different payoffs mainly because of their positions in
the contact network. In particular, if the payoff of a single game is assumed to
be nonnegative, hubs tend to earn more than non-hubs simply because hubs
have more neighbors than non-hubs by definition (Masuda, 2007). However,
as long as the contact network is fixed, a non-hub player will not gain a large
payoff by imitating the strategy of a successful hub neighbor. The number
of neighbors serves as the resource of a player. Then, it may be more natural
to assume that players imitate successful others with a similar number of
neighbors.
Motivated by these examples, I examine evolutionary dynamics in which
a player would imitate successful others having similar preferences or in-
habiting similar environments. I divide the players into two subpopulations
depending on the subjective perception of the result of the game; one may
like a certain outcome of the game, and another may not like the same out-
come. Imitation is assumed to occur within each subpopulation. However,
the interaction occurs as a well-mixed population. I also assume that all the
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individuals have the same ability, i.e., no player is more likely to “win” the
game than others.
2. Model
Consider a population comprising two subpopulations of players such that
the payoff matrix depends on the subpopulation. The payoff is equivalent to
the fitness in the present model. I call the game the subjective payoff game.
Each player, independent of the subpopulation, selects either of the two
strategies denoted by A and B. The case with a general number of strategies
can be analogously formulated. The subjective payoff game and its replicator
dynamics described in the following are a special case of the multipopulation
game proposed before (Taylor, 1979; Schuster et al., 1981a) (for slightly dif-
ferent variants, see Maynard Smith (1982); Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988);
Weibull (1995)).
The population is infinite, well-mixed, and consists of a fraction p (0 <
p < 1) of typeX players and a fraction 1−p of type Y players. The subjective
payoff matrices that an X player and a Y player perceive as row player are
defined by
( A B
A aX bX
B cX dX
)
and
( A B
A aY bY
B cY dY
)
, (1)
respectively. It should be noted that the payoff that an X player, for ex-
ample, perceives depends on the opponent’s strategy (i.e., A or B) but not
on the opponent’s type (i.e., X or Y ). The use of the two payoff matrices
represents different idiosyncrasies in preferences in the two subpopulations.
Alternatively, the payoff matrix differs by subpopulations because X and Y
players have different tendencies to transform the result of the one-shot game
(i.e., one of the four consequences composed of a pair of A and B) into the
fitness. For example, X and Y players may benefit the most from mutual A
and mutual B, respectively.
The fractions of X and Y players that select strategy A are denoted by x
and y, respectively. The fractions of X and Y players that select strategy B
are equal to 1 − x and 1 − y, respectively. The payoffs to an X player with
strategies A and B are given by
piX,A = aX [px+ (1− p)y] + bX [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)] (2)
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and
piX,B = cX [px+ (1− p)y] + dX [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)] , (3)
respectively. The payoff to a Y player is defined with X replaced by Y in
Eqs. (2) and (3).
I assume that in the evolutionary dynamics, the players can only copy
the strategies of peers in the same subpopulation. This assumption reflects
the premise that the payoff in the present model is subjective such that the
only comparison that makes sense is that between the players in the same
subpopulation. The replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff game is then
defined by
x˙ =x [piX,A − (xpiX,A + (1− x)piX,B)]
=x(1− x) {(aX − cX) [px+ (1− p)y] + (bX − dX) [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)]}
(4)
and
y˙ =y(1− y) {(aY − cY ) [px+ (1− p)y] + (bY − dY ) [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)]} ,
(5)
where x˙ and y˙ represent the time derivatives.
3. General results
3.1. Absence of internal equilibrium
If (x, y) is an internal equilibrium (i.e., 0 < x, y < 1) of the repli-
cator dynamics given by Eqs. (4) and (5), (aX − cX) [px+ (1− p)y] +
(bX − dX) [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)] = (aY − cY ) [px+ (1− p)y] + (bY −
dY ) [p(1− x) + (1− p)(1− y)] = 0 must be satisfied. However, this is impos-
sible unless a degenerate condition (aX − cX)(bY −dY ) = (aY − cY )(bX −dX)
is satisfied. Therefore, for a generic pair of payoff matrices, the replicator
dynamics does not have an internal equilibrium.
Three remarks are in order. First, the absence of internal equi-
librium implies that the present dynamics does not allow limit cycles
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998). Second, the present result contrasts
with that for a two-subpopulation dynamics in which the perceived pay-
off matrix depends on the opponent’s subpopulation as well as on the fo-
cal player’s subpopulation. In the latter case, an internal equilibrium or
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limit cycle can exist (Schuster et al., 1981a). Third, the present conclusion
is different from that for the bimatrix game. In the bimatrix game, each
player in subpopulation X exclusively interacts with each player in sub-
population Y . Then, an internal equilibrium can exist, whereas, when it
exists, it is either a saddle or a neutrally stable point surrounded by peri-
odic orbits (Pohley and Thomas, 1979; Selten, 1980; Schuster et al., 1981b;
Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998).
3.2. Invariance under the transformation of payoff matrices
The replicator dynamics without population structure, which is referred
to as the ordinary replicator dynamics in the following, is invariant under
some transformations of the payoff matrix. The dynamics given by Eqs. (4)
and (5) is also invariant under some payoff transformations.
First, trajectories of the ordinary replicator equation are invariant under
the addition of a common constant to all the entries of the payoff matrix.
Similarly, replacing the payoff matrices given by Eq. (1) by(
aX + hX bX + hX
cX + hX dX + hX
)
and
(
aY + hY bY + hY
cY + hY dY + hY
)
, (6)
where hX and hY are arbitrary constants, does not alter the dynamics.
Second, trajectories of the ordinary replicator equation are invariant un-
der multiplication of all the entries of the payoff matrix by a common positive
constant. It only changes the time scale. In the present model, replacing
Eq. (1) by (
kaX kbX
kcX kdX
)
and
(
kaY kbY
kcY kdY
)
, (7)
where k > 0, does not alter the dynamics. It should be noted that the
multiplicative factor for the two payoff matrices has to be the same for the
dynamics to be conserved.
Third, in the ordinary replicator equation, adding a common constant to
any column of the payoff matrix does not alter a trajectory. In the present
model, replacing Eq. (1) by(
aX + hX,A bX + hX,B
cX + hX,A dX + hX,B
)
and
(
aY + hY,A bY + hY,B
cY + hY,A dY + hY,B
)
(8)
does not alter the trajectory for arbitrary hX,A, hX,B, hY,A, and hY,B.
This invariance is a generalization of the first invariance. It is also
equivalent to the invariance relationship found for a more general model
(Schuster and Sigmund, 1981).
6
3.3. Condition for ESS
Let us calculate the conditions for the combination of pure strategies in
each subpopulation to be evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs). Some defi-
nitions of ESS for multipopulation games exist (Taylor, 1979; Schuster et al.,
1981a; Cressman, 1992, 1996; Cressman et al., 2001), and it seems that con-
sensus on the definition of the ESS in the case of multiple subpopulations
has not been reached (Weibull, 1995). Here I adhere to the definition given
in Taylor (1979) (also see Schuster et al. (1981a)), which was proposed for
general two-subpopulation games in which intra-subpopulation and inter-
subpopulation interactions yield a different payoff to a focal player.
I start with stating the definition of the ESS by obeying Taylor (1979).
Consider a general two-subpopulation matrix game such that there arem and
n pure strategies in subpopulations X and Y , respectively. A mixed strategy
in X and Y is parametrized as x = (x1 x2 · · · xm)
⊤ and y = (y1 y2 · · · yn)
⊤,
where xi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and yi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are the probabilities that the mixed
strategy in X and Y takes the ith strategy, respectively,
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi =
1, and ⊤ denotes the transposition. Consider a population of resident players
taking strategies x and y in subpopulations X and Y , respectively. I assume
that the payoff to a player adopting mixed strategy x′ in subpopulation X
embedded in this resident population is given by
x
′⊤(RXXx+RXY y). (9)
Similarly, assume that the payoff to mixed strategy y′ in subpopulation Y
embedded in the same resident population is given by
y
′⊤(RY Xx+RY Y y). (10)
Strategy (x,y) is ESS if for any (x′,y′) 6= (x,y),
x
′⊤(RXXx+RXY y)+y
′⊤(RY Xx+RY Y y) ≤ x
⊤(RXXx+RXY y)+y
⊤(RY Xx+RY Y y).
(11)
When the equality holds in Eq. (11), it is also required that an additional
condition given by
x
′⊤(RXXx
′+RXY y
′)+y′⊤(RY Xx
′+RY Y y
′) < x⊤(RXXx
′+RXY y
′)+y⊤(RY Xx
′+RY Y y
′)
(12)
is satisfied.
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In the case of the subjective payoff game, I obtain m = n = 2,
RXX =p
(
aX bX
cX dX
)
, (13)
RXY =(1− p)
(
aX bX
cX dX
)
, (14)
RY X =p
(
aY bY
cY dY
)
, (15)
RY Y =(1− p)
(
aY bY
cY dY
)
, (16)
x1 = x, x2 = 1 − x, y1 = y, and y2 = 1 − y. Therefore, Eqs. (11) and (12)
are reduced to
[(x− x′)(aX − cX bX − dX) + (y − y
′)(aY − cY bY − dY )]
·
[
p
(
x
1− x
)
+ (1− p)
(
y
1− y
)]
≥ 0 (17)
and
[(x− x′)(aX − cX bX − dX) + (y − y
′)(aY − cY bY − dY )]
·
[
p
(
x′
1− x′
)
+ (1− p)
(
y′
1− y′
)]
> 0 (18)
respectively.
3.4. Pure strategy ESSs
In this section, let us identify the pure strategy ESSs of the subjective
payoff game. First, suppose that the population in which all players in both
subpopulations adopt strategy A is evolutionarily stable. By substituting
x = y = 1 in Eq. (17), I obtain
(1− x′)(aX − cX) + (1− y
′)(aY − cY ) ≥ 0. (19)
Because Eq. (19) must hold true for 0 ≤ x′ < 1 and y′ = 1, a necessary
condition reads aX ≥ cX . If aX ≥ cX is satisfied with equality, Eq. (18) for
the same 0 ≤ x′ < 1 and y′ = 1, i.e.,
(1− x′)(aX − cX bX − dX)
[
p
(
x′
1− x′
)
+ (1− p)
(
1
0
)]
> 0 (20)
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must be satisfied. By substituting aX = cX in Eq. (20), I obtain bX > dX .
The necessary conditions obtained so far are summarized as
aX > cX or (aX = cX and bX > dX). (21)
These conditions are the same as the ESS conditions for the structureless
population. By considering the mutant parametrized by x′ = 1 and 0 ≤ y′ <
1, I similarly obtain the necessary conditions for subpopulation Y as
aY > cY or (aY = cY and bY > dY ). (22)
On the other hand, if Eqs. (21) and (22) are satisfied, Eqs. (17) and (18)
are satisfied for any (x′, y′) 6= (1, 1). Therefore, Eqs. (21) and (22) provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy A to be evolutionarily
stable. In conclusion, A is evolutionarily stable for the entire population if A
is evolutionarily stable in each subpopulation in the ordinary sense. Similarly,
B is an ESS of the subjective payoff game if B is evolutionarily stable in each
subpopulation.
Next, assume that the population in which all the players in subpopu-
lations X and Y adopt A and B, respectively, is evolutionarily stable. By
substituting x = 1 and y = 0 in Eq. (17), I obtain
(1−x′) [(aX − cX)p+ (bX − dX)(1− p)]+y
′ [(aY − cY )p+ (bY − dY )(1− p)] ≥ 0.
(23)
Because Eq. (23) must hold true for 0 ≤ x′ < 1 and y′ = 0, a necessary
condition reads
aXp + bX(1− p) ≥ cXp+ dX(1− p). (24)
If Eq.(24) is satisfied with equality, Eq. (18) for the same 0 ≤ x′ < 1 and
y′ = 0, i.e.,
(1− x′)(aX − cX bX − dX)
[
p
(
x′
1− x′
)
+ (1− p)
(
0
1
)]
> 0, (25)
must be satisfied. By substituting aXp + bX(1 − p) = cXp + dX(1 − p) in
Eq. (25), I obtain
bX > dX . (26)
Similarly, by considering the mutant parametrized by x′ = 1 and 0 ≤ y′ < 1,
I obtain
aY p+ bY (1− p) ≤ cY p+ dY (1− p). (27)
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When Eq. (27) is satisfied with equality, Eq. (18) and aY p + bY (1 − p) =
cY p+ dY (1− p) lead to
aY < cY . (28)
The population given by (x, y) = (1, 0) is an ESS if Eqs. (24) and (27) are
satisfied, Eq. (26) holds true when Eq. (24) is satisfied with equality, and
Eq. (28) holds true when Eq. (27) is satisfied with equality. It should be
noted that the conditions given by Eqs. (24) and (27) depend on p.
3.5. Non-equivalence to the bimatrix game
In this section, I show that the replicator equation of the subjective payoff
game cannot be mapped to the replicator equation of a bimatrix game. It
should be noted that the following arguments can be readily generalized to
the case of an arbitrary number of strategies.
In the bimatrix game in the well-mixed population, we consider all pos-
sible pairs of a player in subpopulation X and a player in subpopulation
Y . The two selected players are involved in a two person game, which is
generally asymmetric. The payoff bimatrix is given by
( A B
A (a˜X , a˜Y ) (b˜X , c˜Y )
B (c˜X , b˜Y ) (d˜X , d˜Y )
)
, (29)
where the first and second elements in each entry of the bimatrix represent
the payoffs imparted to an X player and Y player, respectively. The row and
column players correspond to subpopulations X and Y , respectively. The
payoff to an X player with strategies A and B is equal to a˜Xy+ b˜X(1−y) and
c˜Xy+d˜X(1−y), respectively. Then, the replicator equation for subpopulation
X is given by
x˙ = x(1− x)
[
(a˜X − c˜X)y + (b˜X − d˜X)(1− y)
]
. (30)
Similarly,
y˙ = y(1− y)
[
(a˜Y − c˜Y )x+ (b˜Y − d˜Y )(1− x)
]
. (31)
If the dynamics given by Eqs. (30) and (31) is equivalent to that for the
subjective payoff game (Eqs. (4) and (5)), the comparison of Eqs. (4) and (30)
yields p(aX − bX − cX + dX) = 0 because the right-hand side of Eq. (4) must
be independent of x except for the multiplication factor x(1 − x). Because
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p = 0 implies a structureless population, aX − bX − cX + dX = 0 holds true.
Under this condition, Eq. (4) is reduced to x˙ = x(1 − x)(bX − dX). Then,
a˜X − b˜X − c˜X + d˜X = 0 and b˜X − d˜X = bX − dX must hold true. Similarly,
aY − bY − cY + dY = a˜Y − b˜Y − c˜Y + d˜Y = 0 and b˜Y − d˜Y = bY − dY must
hold true. Except for this degenerate case, the two dynamics are not mapped
from one to the other.
4. Examples
4.1. Snowdrift game
Consider the snowdrift game, also called the chicken game or the hawk-
dove game, which represents a social dilemma situation (Sugden, 1986;
Hauert and Doebeli, 2004). The snowdrift game in two subpopulations in
which the payoff matrix for a player depends on the opponent’s subpopula-
tion as well as the focal player’s subpopulation is analyzed in Auger et al.
(2001). In the case without population structure, a standard payoff matrix
for the snowdrift game is given by
( A B
A β − 1
2
β − 1
B β 0
)
, (32)
where β > 1. Strategies A and B correspond to cooperation and defection,
respectively. If the opponent cooperates, it is better to defect. Otherwise, it
is better to cooperate. The mixed population with a fraction of A players
given by x∗ = (2β − 2)/(2β − 1) is the unique ESS.
Consider the case in which the β value depends on the subpopulation.
Denote by βX and βY the subpopulation-dependent β value such that(
aX bX
cX dX
)
=
(
βX −
1
2
βX − 1
βX 0
)
(33)
and (
aY bY
cY dY
)
=
(
βY −
1
2
βY − 1
βY 0
)
. (34)
Without loss of generality, I assume that βX > βY > 1.
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Equations (4) and (5) read, respectively,
x˙ =x(1− x)
{
(βX − 1)−
(
βX −
1
2
)
[px+ (1− p)y]
}
, (35)
y˙ =y(1− y)
{
(βY − 1)−
(
βY −
1
2
)
[px+ (1− p)y]
}
. (36)
Therefore, I obtain


x˙ > 0, y˙ > 0 if px+ (1− p)y < βY−1
βY −1/2
,
x˙ > 0, y˙ < 0 if βY −1
βY −1/2
< px+ (1− p)y < βX−1
βX−1/2
,
x˙ < 0, y˙ < 0 if px+ (1− p)y > βX−1
βX−1/2
.
(37)
Equation (37) implies that the replicator dynamics has the unique stable
equilibrium whose location depends on the p value. If 0 < p < (βY −
1)/(βY − 1/2), the stable equilibrium is located at
(x∗, y∗) =
(
1,−
p
1− p
+
βY − 1
(1− p)(βY − 1/2)
)
. (38)
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(a). This equilibrium is an ESS,
which is shown in Appendix with the use of the ESS criterion established in
Taylor (1979). If (βY − 1)/(βY − 1/2) ≤ p ≤ (βX − 1)/(βX − 1/2), the stable
equilibrium is located at
(x∗, y∗) = (1, 0). (39)
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(b). In this case, the equilibrium
is an ESS because Eqs. (24), (26), (27), and (28) are satisfied. Finally, if
(βX − 1)/(βX − 1/2) < p < 1, the stable equilibrium is located at
(x∗, y∗) =
(
βX − 1
p(βX − 1/2)
, 0
)
. (40)
An example of this case is shown in Fig. 1(c). This equilibrium is also an ESS
(see Appendix for the proof). In all three cases, X , i.e., the subpopulation
with the larger β value, has a larger fraction of A players than Y does.
In particular, at least one subpopulation is monomorphic for any p; A
monopolizes subpopulation X , or B monopolizes subpopulation Y . Even a
slight difference in the payoff matrix (i.e., β value) in the two subpopulations
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yields polarization of the strategies. Similar polarization also occurs in the
bimatrix snowdrift game. However, the internal equilibrium exists but is a
saddle in the case of the bimatrix game (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) such
that the mechanism is different from that for the subjective payoff snowdrift
game.
4.2. Coordination game
Consider a coordination game in which the players in different subpopu-
lations have different preference of one strategy over the other. Specifically,
let us set the payoff matrix for subpopulations X and Y to
(
aX bX
cX dX
)
=
(
1 + αX 0
0 1− αX
)
(41)
and (
aY bY
cY dY
)
=
(
1 + αY 0
0 1− αY
)
, (42)
respectively, where −1 < αY < 0 < αX < 1. Players in X and Y prefer
strategies A and B, respectively. Equations (41) and (42) can be regarded
as a payoff bimatrix of the Battle of the Sexes game (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
However, in the bimatrix game, the population is composed of two subpop-
ulations corresponding to the roles in the game. In contrast, the players in
the present game do not have roles and interact in a well-mixed population.
Given Eqs. (41) and (42), Eqs. (4) and (5) read
x˙ =x(1− x) [p(2x− 1) + (1− p)(2y − 1) + αX ] , (43)
y˙ =y(1− y) [p(2x− 1) + (1− p)(2y − 1) + αY ] . (44)
Near x = y = 1, p(2x − 1) + (1 − p)(2y − 1) + αX > p(2x − 1) + (1 −
p)(2y − 1) + αY > 0 is satisfied. Therefore, (x
∗, y∗) = (1, 1) is a stable
equilibrium of the replicator equations of the subjective payoff coordination
game. Because Eqs. (21) and (22) are satisfied with Eqs. (41) and (42),
(x∗, y∗) = (1, 1) is an ESS. Similarly, because p(2x−1)+(1−p)(2y−1)+αY <
p(2x − 1) + (1 − p)(2y − 1) + αX < 0 near x = y = 0, (x
∗, y∗) = (0, 0) is a
stable equilibrium. Because Eqs. (41) and (42) yield bX < dX and bY < dY ,
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) is another ESS. These results are consistent with those for
the coordination game without population structure; the two strategies are
bistable.
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The subjective payoff version of the coordination game yields two phe-
nomena that are absent in the same game without population structure.
First, the polarized configuration in which all the X players adopt A and all
the Y players adopt B is an stable equilibrium if
1− αX
2
< p <
1− αY
2
. (45)
When Eq. (45) is satisfied, Eqs. (24) and (27) are satisfied with inequality
such that this population is a pure-strategy ESS. Equation (45) is satisfied
if p is close to 1/2 or if αX or −αY (> 0), i.e., the asymmetry in the liking of
the two actions, is large. As an example, the attractive basins of the three
equilibria for p = 0.5, αX = 0.3, and αY = −0.2 are shown in Fig. 2(a).
The final configuration of the population depends on the initial condition. It
should be noted that stable coexistence of the opposite pure strategies does
not occur in the bimatrix coordination game (i.e., Battle of the Sexes game).
Second, the fraction of players employing a strategy in a subpopulation
can non-monotonically change in time. Some non-monotonic trajectories
starting from different initial conditions are shown in Fig. 2(b) with p = 0.7,
αX = 0.2, and αY = −0.2. x˙ > 0 holds true to the right of the thick solid
line in Fig. 2(b). If the initial condition is located slightly right to this line,
y first decreases because y˙ < 0 holds true to the left of the thick dotted
line. If x˙(> 0) is not large, the trajectory eventually crosses the thick solid
line (x˙ = 0) such that x starts to decrease. If the initial x˙ value is large
enough, the trajectory eventually crosses the thick dotted line (y˙ = 0) such
that y starts to increase. In both cases, the trajectory shows non-monotonic
behavior. Such a non-monotonic behavior does not occur in the coordination
game without population structure.
In extensions of the Ising model (Galam, 1997) and the voter model
(Masuda et al., 2010; Masuda and Redner, 2011), which are non-game pop-
ulation dynamics, idiosyncratic preferences of individuals lead to coexistence
of different states, where states are equivalent to strategies in games. The
present results are consistent with these results in that idiosyncratic pref-
erences let multiple states coexist when unanimity necessarily occurs in the
absence of idiosyncrasy.
4.3. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma
In this section, I examine the possibility of cooperation in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) in which the unconditional cooperation (C) and
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unconditional defection (D) are strategies A and B, respectively. I do not
assume error in action implementation and do assume that a next round
of the game between the same pair of players occurs with probability w
(0 < w < 1). The following results also hold true if C is replaced by the tit-
for-tat (TFT) or the so-called GRIM strategy. TFT starts with cooperation
and selects the previous action (i.e., cooperate or defect) selected by the
opponent. GRIM strategy starts with cooperation and switches to permanent
defection once the opponent ever defects. The invariance of the following
results holds true because the payoff matrix for the IPD, i.e., Eq. (47) below,
does not change when C is replaced by TFT or GRIM.
Consider a standard payoff matrix for the single-shot prisoner’s dilemma
given by
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
, (46)
where b and c are the benefit and the cost of cooperation and satisfy b > c >
0. The expected payoff matrix for the IPD in the structureless population is
given by
( C D
C b−c
1−w
−c
D b 0
)
. (47)
If
w > wcrit ≡
c
b
, (48)
the prisoner’s dilemma is effectively transformed into a coordination game
such that mutual cooperation by C and mutual defection by D are bistable
(Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006).
Let us consider the situation in which two subpopulations possess different
discount factors wX and wY . In other words, assume(
aX bX
cX dX
)
=
(
b−c
1−wX
−c
b 0
)
(49)
and (
aY bY
cY dY
)
=
(
b−c
1−wY
−c
b 0
)
. (50)
Because the duration of IPD is the same for the two players, I interpret
that X players put more emphasis on long-term benefits than Y players.
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Specifically, I assume
wY <
c
b
< wX . (51)
Given Eq. (51), Eq. (5) implies y˙ < 0 for all 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1. Therefore,
D eventually occupies subpopulation Y . I examine the possibility that co-
operation occurs in subpopulation X . On the line y = 0, Eq. (4) is reduced
to
x˙ = x(1− x)
[
(b− c)wXpx
1− wX
− c
]
. (52)
Therefore, the population in which D dominates in both subpopulations, i.e.,
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), is always a stable equilibrium of the replicator equations of
the subjective payoff IPD game. It is an ESS because Eqs. (49) and (50)
imply bX < dX and bY < dY , respectively.
Equation (52) implies that the combination of C in subpopulation X and
D in subpopulation Y is a stable equilibrium if
wX > wX,crit ≡
1(
b
c
− 1
)
p+ 1
. (53)
Because Eq. (24) and Eq. (27) are satisfied with inequality when Eq. (53)
holds true, this population is an ESS. A large p (i.e., large fraction of X play-
ers) and a large benefit-to-cost ratio b/c lessen wX,crit such that cooperation
would occur.
The threshold discount factors wcrit and wX,crit are compared in Fig. 3
for some p values. The figure indicates that for a wide range of p, the con-
dition for cooperation in the subjective payoff case is not very severe rela-
tive to the case without population structure. In particular, both wcrit and
wX,crit tend to unity in the limit b/c → 1. As b/c → ∞, it follows that
wX,crit/wcrit → 1/p and both wcrit and wX,crit converge to 0. When p = 1/2,
condition (53) coincides with the condition for the risk dominance of C over
D in the structureless population, i.e., w > 2c/(b+ c).
5. Discussion
I proposed the so-called subjective payoff game and its replicator dynam-
ics. The model is mathematically a special case of the previously analyzed
model with two subpopulations (Taylor, 1979; Schuster et al., 1981a). How-
ever, the present model is motivated by the possibility that different players
may perceive the same result of the game to transform it to the fitness in
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different manners. The model shows polarization in the snowdrift and coor-
dination games, non-monotonic time courses in the coordination game, and
a wide margin of cooperation in the IPD. Extension of the present model to
the case of more than two strategies and more than two subpopulations is
straightforward. Generalizing the present results for such extended models
warrants future work.
The replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff game is different from
that of the bimatrix game (section 3.5). In addition, the subjective pay-
off game cannot be mapped to a model with strategy-dependent interaction
rates, which does not have multiple subpopulations within each of which
imitation occurs (Taylor and Nowak, 2006). The subjective payoff game is
also different from those in which interaction is confined in single subpopula-
tions, such as group selection models (Wilson, 1975; West et al., 2007), island
model (Taylor, 1992), and evolutionary set theory (Tarnita et al., 2009).
The present model is distinct from previous models of evolution of prefer-
ence (e.g., Sandholm (2001); Dekel et al. (2007); Alger and Weibull (2012);
Grund et al. (2013)) and the so-called subjective game (Kalai and Lehrer,
1995; Matsushima, 1997; Oechssler and Schipper, 2003). Both in these and
present models, the preference, or the subjective payoff, is assumed to be
consistent within each individual (Gintis, 2009). In these previous models,
the utility that a player maximizes and the fitness on which the selection
pressure operates are different. A player in such a model is rational enough
to be able to personally maximize the player’s idiosyncratic utility. In the
present model, as in standard evolutionary models, a player is subjected to
bounded rationality and tends to imitate successful others (i.e., social learn-
ing). The difference from standard evolutionary models is that, in the present
model, each player limits the set of possible parents from whom the strategy
is copied to those with the same idiosyncratic payoff. In this way, the player
can pursue both maximization of fitness via social learning and consistency
with the player’s idiosyncratic preference.
The subjective payoff game does not allow internal equilibria regardless
of the stability. This result has implications in games in which internal equi-
libria play an important role in structureless populations. In the snowdrift
game, a mixture of the two strategies is stable under ordinary replicator dy-
namics. In contrast, in the subjective payoff game, a slight difference in the
payoff matrices perceived by the two subpopulations leads to polarization
such that the two subpopulations tend to select the opposite strategies.
The rock–scissors–paper game comprises three strategies that cyclically
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dominate one another. It is straightforward to show that there is no in-
ternal equilibrium in the subjective payoff game with a general number of
strategies. Therefore, the subjective payoff variant of the rock–scissors–paper
game lacks the internal equilibrium of any kind and limit cycles. Such a
game behaves very differently from the same game played in the structure-
less population (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998; Nowak, 2006), bimatrix
population (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988, 1998; Sato et al., 2002), and two
subpopulations with different social learning rates (Masuda, 2008); these
models allow a unique internal equilibrium. It may be interesting to examine
the rock–scissors–paper game under the current framework.
I assumed that players imitate others in the same subpopulation. In fact,
there may be competition of update rules between such players and those
that imitate from the entire population. Nevertheless, at least near pure sta-
ble equilibria, the population is considered to be resistant against invasion by
mutants that imitate from the entire population. To explain why, let us sup-
pose that X and Y players select A and B in the equilibrium. A mutant that
imitates from the entire population and attempts to invade subpopulation X
would sometimes select B because Y players select B. Because A, not B, is
the best response in this population, such a mutant is considered not able to
invade the subpopulation of resident players. Therefore, the imitation rule
considered in the present study is considered to have evolutionary stability,
at least in this case.
Appendix
In this section, I show that the equilibria given by Eqs. (38) and (40) are
ESSs of the subjective payoff snowdrift game. To this end, I use a matrix
criterion for the ESS (Taylor, 1979) accommodated to the case of the two-
strategy game.
Assume that a population given by (x∗, y∗) satisfies
(x′ 1− x′)
[
RXX
(
x∗
1− x∗
)
+RXY
(
y∗
1− y∗
)]
≤ (x∗ 1− x∗)
[
RXX
(
x∗
1− x∗
)
+RXY
(
y∗
1− y∗
)]
(54)
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and
(y′ 1− y′)
[
RY X
(
x∗
1− x∗
)
+RY Y
(
y∗
1− y∗
)]
≤ (y∗ 1− y∗)
[
RY X
(
x∗
1− x∗
)
+RY Y
(
y∗
1− y∗
)]
(55)
for (x′, y′) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 1). I also assume that Eqs. (54) and
(55) are satisfied with equality for (x′, y′) = (0, 0) if x∗ < 1 and y∗ < 1, for
(x′, y′) = (1, 0) if x∗ > 0 and y∗ < 1, for (x′, y′) = (0, 1) if x∗ < 1 and y∗ > 0,
and for (x′, y′) = (1, 1) if x∗ > 0 and y∗ > 0. The criterion dictates that
(x∗, y∗) is an ESS if and only if
(x1 − x1 y1 − y1)
(
RXX RXY
RY X RY Y
)
x1
−x1
y1
−y1

 < 0. (56)
Here, x1 6= 0 (y1 6= 0) if and only if the payoff of a pure A player in subpop-
ulation X (Y ) and that of a pure B player in subpopulation X (Y ) are the
same in the equilibrium of interest.
Under the snowdrift game, the assumptions for (x∗, y∗) are satisfied when
(x∗, y∗) is given by Eq. (38) or (40). Substitution of Eqs. (13), (14), (15),
(16), (33), and (34) in Eq. (56) yields
[px1 + (1− p)y1] ·
[
x1
(
1
2
− βX
)
+ y1
(
1
2
− βY
)]
< 0. (57)
For the equilibrium given by Eq. (38) to be an ESS, Eq. (57) must be satisfied
for x1 = 0 and y1 6= 0. For the equilibrium given by Eq. (40) to be an ESS,
Eq. (57) must be satisfied for x1 6= 0 and y1 = 0. In fact, Eq. (57) is satisfied
in both cases. Therefore, the two equilibria are ESSs.
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Figure 1: The isoclines and direction field for the replicator dynamics of the subjective
payoff snowdrift game with βX = 1.4 and βY = 1.3. The filled circles indicate the ESSs.
(a) p = 0.3. (b) p = 0.4. (c) p = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Replicator dynamics of the subjective payoff coordination game. The magenta,
green, and blue regions represent the attractive basins for (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), (1, 1), and
(1, 0), respectively. The thick solid lines represent x˙ = 0, i.e., y = −px/(1 − p) + (1 −
αX)/2(1−p). The thick dotted lines represent y˙ = 0, i.e., y = −px/(1−p)+(1−αY )/2(1−
p). (a) p = 0.5, αX = 0.3, and αY = −0.2. (b) p = 0.7, αX = 0.2, and αY = −0.2. The
thin solid curves in (b) represent trajectories converging to (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) or (1, 1).
For calculating the attractive basins and individual trajectories, the Euler scheme with
dt = 0.005 was used.
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Figure 3: Threshold discount factors above which C is locally stable in the IPD. In the
subjective payoff game, I set p = 0.3, p = 0.5, and p = 0.7.
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